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ESSAY 
 
APPLAUSE FOR THE PLAUSIBLE 
BRANDON L. GARRETT† 
INTRODUCTION 
Why has the word “plausible” come to define federal civil litigation? In 
recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court supplemented longstanding pleading 
standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require a 
“short and plain statement of the claim,”1 to additionally require that all 
civil pleadings state a claim that is “plausible.”2 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, the Court rejected other possible words that might describe the 
newly tightened pleading standard, such as “reasonable” or “probable.”3 To 
the dismay of many judges, lawyers, and other observers, the Court did not 
define “plausible,” except to add that “plausible” pleadings “nudge[] their 
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”4 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
the Court again did not define “plausible,” except to assert that a “plausible” 
claim must not be “conclusory” in nature.5 This Essay explores the complex 
and contradictory meanings of the word “plausible.”  
Furthermore, this Essay applauds the Supreme Court’s selection of such 
an equivocal and conflicted word as the gateway to federal civil litigation. 
 
† Roy L. and Rosamund Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of Virginia School 
of Law. Many thanks to Toby Heytens, Alex Reinert, George Rutherglen, and Colin Starger for 
their invaluable comments. 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
2 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
557 (2007). 
3 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 
requirement’ . . . .”). 
4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 
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As I describe below, “plausible” means “fair” or “reasonable,” but perhaps 
only in a superficial sense; what is “plausible” might in fact be “specious” or 
used as a “pretext.”6 The word is immune to careful definition. Because of 
its ambiguity, it was well selected to expand judicial discretion to dismiss 
civil cases. In specific areas of federal civil litigation, the Court has recently 
broadened judges’ discretion to dismiss a wide range of civil petitions: civil 
rights claims, habeas petitions, class action certification petitions, and more.7 
In those contexts, the Court uses words like “reasonable” in ways that bend 
their meaning, suggest more objectivity than warranted, and create genuine 
confusion between doctrines by using the same word in different ways.  
Despite substantial confusion over the choice of the word “plausible” to 
govern pleading in federal civil litigation, at least one can say that the word 
itself captures the essence of the problem rather than disguising it. Whether 
the resulting discretion conferred on district judges is itself warranted or 
desirable is a very different question, and a matter of real concern. Because 
“plausibility” pleading enhances judicial discretion, the meaning of “plausible” 
may increasingly depend on judicial practice and the litigation contexts 
where the word is used. Nonetheless, rather than viewing the word selection 
as an accident or a misplaced reference, I suggest that the word was deliberately 
chosen to be deeply . . . plausible.  
I. PLAUSIBLE DEFINITIONS 
When Justice Souter, Twombly’s author, saw how Iqbal would expand his 
concept of “plausibility” pleading two years later, he was driven to envision 
space aliens. He argued in a vigorous dissent that judges should dismiss for 
“plausibility” reasons only “sufficiently fantastic” pleadings—like those 
involving extraterrestrials, “the plaintiff ’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences 
in time travel.”8 Thus, Justice Souter opined that the majority’s interpretation 
of “plausible” was a “fundamental misunderstanding.”9  
Given the Supreme Court’s own struggle to define “plausible,” it is no 
surprise lower courts have adopted a range of interpretations when struggling 
with the new “plausibility” standard.10 Scholars have similarly thrown up 
 
6 See infra Part I. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
9 Id. at 695. 
10 See generally Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the 
Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 505, 520-26 (2009) (highlighting the Third and Tenth Circuits’ opaque tests, as well as the 
Second and Seventh Circuits’ “sliding-scale” approach). 
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their hands.11 Professor Alex Reinert rightly describes the confusion created 
as partly “linguistic,”12 while Professor Arthur Miller notes that “inconsistent 
rulings on virtually identical complaints may well be based on individual 
judges having quite different subjective views of what allegations are 
plausible.”13 Similarly, Professor Tung Yin calls the Court’s definition itself 
“peculiar, if not implausible,”14 and Professor Patricia Hatamyar comments 
that “[a]t this point, the law of pleading consists of pronouncements worthy 
of Lao-tzu.”15  
“Plausibility” does not require heightened pleading, except that it does. 
Judges are not to weigh evidence, except that they must: after all, “plausible” 
was previously used by the Court in the summary judgment context.16 
Deciding what is a “mere conclusion”17 and what is a factual assertion to be 
weighed raises difficult questions; after all, “one person’s ‘conclusion’ is 
another person’s ‘fact.’”18 Furthermore, many allegations raise mixed 
questions of law and fact.  
Although few scholars or judges have discussed the definition of “plausible,” 
scholars have generally disapproved of the word choice. Professor Louis 
Kaplow, one of the few to dwell on the definition, notes: “As a matter of 
clarity in communication, it is unfortunate that the Court chose as its key 
term one having as a standard definition the very notion it meant to 
reject.”19 When in doubt, judges may turn to dictionary definitions of 
 
11 For a sampling of the voluminous critical literature, see, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen 
C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 831 (2010) (“[T]he Court’s 
route to Iqbal’s result, built on Twombly’s trail, will mess up the civil litigation system.”); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 459 (2008) (“[T]he Court's 
plausibility standard may require different levels of factual detail depending upon the substantive 
context.”). See also infra notes 12-15, 19 and accompanying text. 
12 Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1-2 (2012). 
13 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 30 (2010).  
14 Tung Yin, “I Do Not Think [Implausible] Means What You Think It Means”: Iqbal v. Ashcroft 
and Judicial Vouching for Government Officials, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 203, 204 (2010).  
15 Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 
AM. U. L. REV. 553, 583 (2010). See generally id. 583, n.197 (sampling the perplexing and self-
contradictory aphorisms found in the TAO TE CHING, a classic Chinese text). 
16 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1986) 
(“[T]he absence of any plausible motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to 
whether a ‘genuine issue for trial’ exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e).” (emphasis added)). 
17 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) (“A court considering a motion to dismiss 
may begin by identifying allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not entitled to 
the assumption of truth.”). 
18 Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 566. 
19 Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1256 n.187 (2013); see also 
Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton Handler, and 
the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. LITIG. 1, 14 (2008) (“[T]he use of the 
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words; however, as some judges recognize, dictionary definitions may not 
be helpful when more than one definition is “plausible.”20 Some judges have 
tried unsuccessfully to fix meaning to the word “plausible” using dictionary 
definitions. For example, one dissenting judge in an Eleventh Circuit 
opinion noted: “Synonyms for ‘plausible’ include ‘credible,’ ‘creditable,’ 
‘likely,’ ‘believable,’ ‘presumptive’ and ‘probable.’”21 In another case, when a 
doctor was asked to testify about medical “plausibility,” the doctor 
answered: “Plausible ... is a very vague term. It’s a hypothetical possibility.”22  
Confusion notwithstanding, “plausible” has a range of definitions that 
shed light on the task for which the word has been so recently elevated by 
the Supreme Court. Take for example, these three definitions from the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary: “plausible” means (1) “superficially fair, 
reasonable, or valuable but often specious <a plausible pretext>,” (2) “super-
ficially pleasing or persuasive <a swindler…, then a quack, then a smooth, 
plausible gentleman — R. W. Emerson>,” or (3) “appearing worthy of belief 
<the argument was both powerful and plausible>.”23 Indeed, in the Twombly 
opinion, later reversed by the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit noted 
that, in another context, the Ninth Circuit had employed a definition of 
“plausible” from an early edition of Webster’s Dictionary: “superficially 
worthy of belief: CREDIBLE.”24  
Other dictionary definitions convey similarly contradictory meanings. 
None suggests a fixed or objective measure of truth or accuracy. If anything, 
dictionary definitions of “plausible” imply a lack of objective measures. The 
MacMillan Dictionary defines “plausible” as “likely to be true” or “able to 
be considered seriously for a particular job or purpose.”25 The Oxford 
 
term plausible to describe the heightened pleading standard seems like an odd choice.” (emphasis 
in original)). But see Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 209 (2010) 
(explaining that the Court’s use of “plausible” comports with the word’s dictionary definition).  
20 See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 651 n.6 (2004) (“[E]ither definition of 
‘accident’ is at first glance plausible . . . .”).  
21 Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010) (Ryskamp, J., dissenting). 
22 Althen v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 58 Fed. Cl. 270, 283 (Fed. Cl. 
2003) (ellipsis in original). 
23 Plausible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plausible 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2014) (emphasis and ellipsis in original). 
24 Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 
(quoting Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 664 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1736 (Philip Babcock Gove & The Merriam-
Webster Editorial Staff eds., 1976 ed.))). 
25 Plausible, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com / us / diction ary /
american/plausible (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
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Dictionary defines “plausible” as “seeming reasonable or probable.”26 These 
dictionaries also include definitions suggesting that “plausible” connotes the 
opposite of the truth. The Oxford Dictionary, for example, adds that, when 
used as an adjective for a person, “plausible” can mean “skilled at producing 
persuasive arguments, especially ones intended to deceive: a plausible liar.”27 
The word’s superficial and possibly negative connection to accuracy is built 
into its meaning. 
Black’s Law Dictionary has no definition of “plausible,” because it is not a 
word that has gained accepted legal usage—unlike “reasonable,” “probable,” 
and some others. Common legal parlance implies that a “plausible” argu-
ment is not yet fully formed. At the pleading stage, facts are alleged and not 
yet proven, and requiring only “plausible” allegations may be appropriate; 
however, that again depends (1) on whether a “plausibility” standard 
requires some degree of accuracy attached to the allegations, and (2) if it 
does, on the degree of accuracy required. Without defining the word, Black’s 
Law Dictionary suggests a definition elsewhere, in its definition of “colorable,” a 
synonym for “plausible” in legal parlance: “That which is in appearance 
only, and not in reality, what it purports to be, hence counterfeit, feigned, 
having the appearance of truth.”28 However, a plaintiff would not want to 
embrace this definition’s connotation that what is “plausible” on the exterior 
disguises a claim “not in reality.” 
In contrast to the current “plausibility” pleading standard, the prior notice-
pleading standard did not purport to address factual support for claims at 
all, and thus avoided the difficulty of determining when facts were sufficiently 
“plausible.”29 Having decided to test factual allegations, perhaps the word 
“plausible”—with its equivocal meanings—accurately conveys the most 
realistic expectations for judges ruling at the pleading stage, when allegations 
are assumed to be true. Further, the word’s evasive meaning explains why 
so few courts have relied on dictionary definitions—and perhaps why the 
Court declined to provide a definition for “plausible” in Twombly and Iqbal.  
 
26 Plausible, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http:// oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_
english/plausible (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). Regardless, the Court was clear it was not adopting a 
“probability” measure when it selected the “plausibility” standard. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
27 Plausible, supra note 26 (emphasis in original). 
28 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 265 (6th ed. 1990). 
29 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (explaining that the 
“simplified notice pleading standard” under the  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “relies on liberal 
discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose 
of unmeritorious claims”) 
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II. PLAUSIBLE PEOPLE 
The choice of the word “plausible” brings with it cultural associations, 
including longstanding use in literature to refer to people who are superficial. 
This Part describes a few well-known literary examples in which the authors 
used “plausible” to describe unsavory people who use false appearances to 
take advantage of others. They show how, despite our efforts to assess 
people’s truthfulness, our lie-detecting skills are limited—as is our information 
about the people being judged. The anxiety generated by these literary 
characters mirrors that faced by judges, who must now—with only preliminary 
representations by the parties—assess the plausibility of allegations made 
in litigation.  
The full Emerson quotation excerpted in the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary30 is wonderful and apt:  
So each man, like each plant, has his parasites. A strong, astringent, bilious 
nature has more truculent enemies than the slugs and moths that fret my 
leaves. Such an [sic] one has curcilios, borers, knife-worms: a swindler ate 
him first, then a client, then a quack, then smooth, plausible gentlemen, 
bitter and selfish as Moloch.31 
This strong, astringent person, beset by clients but also by the “quack” and 
the “plausible gentlemen,” sounds like a lawyer with an active civil practice.  
Charles Dickens, in a more caustic and lengthier parody, discusses the 
“plausible gentleman” and the “plausible lady” as “a plausible couple.”32 
Such a couple are “people of the world,” and “while the plausible couple 
depreciate, they are still careful to preserve their character for amiability 
and kind feeling; indeed the depreciation itself is often made to grow out of 
their excessive sympathy and good will.”33  
William Shakespeare uses an archaic form, “plausive,”34 to refer to a 
display of public manners by a person who may not be what he seems, and 
also to refer to powerful and deeply felt expressions. Hamlet describes the 
 
30 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
31 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS AND POEMS 387 (Barnes & Noble Classics 2004). 
32 CHARLES DICKENS, The Plausible Couple, in SKETCHES OF YOUNG LADIES, YOUNG 
GENTLEMEN, AND YOUNG COUPLES 54, 56-57 (London, Chapman & Hall 1843), available at 
http://www.dickens-online.info/sketches-of-young-couples-page19.html. 
33 Id. at 55, 60. 
34 See Plausive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/
plausive (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) (defining “plausive” to mean both “pleasing” (in obsolete uses 
of the word) and “specious” (in archaic uses)). 
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“form of plausive manners” that appear to mark some men with a “defect.”35 
In contrast, the King in All’s Well That Ends Well describes his old friend’s 
“plausive words,” that not only rang true, but also were “scatter’d not in 
ears, but grafted [there], [t]o grow.”36  
The word’s origins trace back to the Latin plausibilis, which means “worthy 
of applause.”37 Perhaps that Latin root gets it best. We may applaud 
something that is superficially pleasing when it is a show, a spectacle, or in 
literature. However, we do not applaud something that is the work of a 
“quack” or a “smooth, plausible gentleman” whose doings are not for our 
entertainment, but rather, at our expense. Similarly, when we listen to a 
courtier’s mannered words, an old friend’s sympathetic advice, or a swindler’s 
enticing promises, we may cautiously judge the worth of these statements.  
In contrast, the legal system demands of a judge more than a decision 
about whether to applaud. We hold lawyers to professional and ethical 
standards when they plead a legal claim or defense on behalf of a client. 
Moreover, discovery, summary judgment procedures, and applicable rules 
of evidence at a trial will ideally uncover more reliable information about 
the merits of a claim. Yet, assessing “plausibility” at the initial pleading 
stage, before discovery, may force judges to size up a person’s “plausibility”—
or rather, “applaudability”—as they would in a social or business setting. 
III. LESS APPLAUSE-WORTHY ALTERNATIVES: “REASONABLE,” 
“STRONG,” AND “CONVINCING” 
If the Supreme Court needed to define a heightened standard for civil 
pleading, then choosing “plausible” as the standard is preferable to other 
word choices, which might have caused far more concern. To start, consider 
the myriad uses for the workhorse term “reasonable.” For example, the 
Court’s qualified immunity decisions lifted the word “reasonable” from 
familiar uses in the Fourth Amendment context, and began applying it to 
all § 1983 constitutional-tort suits against executive officers.38 The Court 
 
35 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, THE PRINCE OF DENMARK 
act 1, sc. 4, ll. 30-31 (J.J.M. Tobin ed., Wadsworth, Cengage Learning 2012). 
36 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ALL’S WELL THAT ENDS WELL act 1, sc. 2, ll. 53-55 (Sir 
Arthur Quiller-Couch & John Dover Wilson eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1965). 
37 Latin Definition for: Plausibilis, Plausibilis, Plausibile, LATDICT, http://www.latin-
dictionary. net/definition/30685/plausibilis-plausibilis-plausibile (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
38 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 801 (1982)). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color 
of any statute . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured . . . .”). 
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recognized an affirmative defense for officials who violate a plaintiff ’s 
constitutional rights, if the officials can show that they acted in a way that 
was objectively “reasonable” to an official in light of “clearly established” 
law in place at the time.39 That usage gives judges authority to dismiss civil 
rights cases early on in litigation, based on their judgment that any constitu-
tional violation might have nevertheless been tolerable. 
In habeas corpus litigation, the word “reasonable” may do double, triple, 
or even quadruple duty when analyzing a prisoner’s constitutional claim—
and for each separate usage, the word is used in a very different sense.  
First, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA) imposes a requirement on state habeas petitioners to show that a 
state court adjudicated their claims “contrary to . . . clearly established 
Federal law,” or at least in a manner that “involved an unreasonable application 
of clearly established Federal law.”40 The Supreme Court noted in Williams 
v. Taylor that “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to define,” but 
the Court nevertheless maintained that a decision must be more than 
“incorrect,” it “must also be unreasonable.”41 Second, an underlying consti-
tutional habeas claim may prompt analysis of whether prior counsel’s 
representation fell below “an objective standard of reasonableness,” and 
whether that inadequate representation had a “reasonable probability” of 
affecting the outcome.42 Third, separate harmless-error tests ask whether 
there is a “reasonable” probability that the error was prejudicial.43 Finally, 
the Court’s innocence “gateway to defaulted claims” asks whether, based on 
new evidence of innocence, a “reasonable juror” would find guilt “beyond a 
 
39 Id.  
40 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
41 529 U.S. 362, 410-11 (2000). More recently, the Supreme Court has sown deep—and, 
hopefully, unintended and remediable—confusion by implicitly endorsing a formulation that 
Williams rejected as misleading and subjective. In Harrington v. Richter, the Court mentioned in 
dicta that the AEDPA unreasonableness standard asks whether “there is no possibility fair-minded 
jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” 131 S. 
Ct. 770, 786 (2011). But see Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10 (refusing to define “‘an unreasonable 
application’ by reference to a ‘reasonable jurist’”). For criticism of the Richter decision, see, as an 
example, Amy Knight Burns, Note, Counterfactual Contractions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis of 
AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 220-21 (2013), which notes “inconsistency and incoherence 
lurking in the Richter opinion.” 
42 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
43 See generally, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (establishing a federal 
habeas harmless-error standard that bars habeas relief when a constitutional error had no 
“substantial and injurious effect,” or when no “actual prejudice” resulted). Furthermore, as noted 
above, the Court defines “prejudice” for ineffective assistance of counsel claims as that which 
creates a “reasonable probability” that an error affected the habeas petitioner’s outcome in the 
original case. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); see also supra note 42 and 
accompanying text. 
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reasonable doubt.”44 Overall, habeas corpus review is replete with the very 
different roles and meanings assigned to the word “reasonable.” Justice 
Scalia has commented that such doctrines create “ineffable gradations of 
probability . . . beyond the ability of the judicial mind (or any mind) to grasp.”45 
Sometimes a standard explicitly calls for a higher probability—but still 
may not define it precisely. For example, in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court explained that for pleadings under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, “[t]o qualify as ‘strong[,]’ . . . an 
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it 
must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of 
nonfraudulent intent.”46 Yet, the Court notes that “Congress left the key 
term ‘strong inference’ undefined.”47 Similarly, the Court’s recent intervention 
into class action litigation in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes described the 
need for “convincing proof” to support class certification.48 However, since 
“convincing,” like “plausible” in Twombly and Iqbal, was not precisely 
defined, “[t]he majority’s language in Wal-Mart has the potential to work 
the same mischief.”49  
Perhaps standards about certainty are clearer when they refer to an 
accepted standard of proof, like “a preponderance of the evidence” or 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” In those contexts, there is judicial experience 
in considering the relevant standards, and deference to decisions of fact-
finders when applying them in the first instance. In contrast, efforts to erect 
new threshold standards (e.g., based on the terms “reasonable,” “strong,” or 
“convincing”) raise special challenges. The word “plausible” may be vague 
and susceptible to contradictory meanings, but at least it does not risk 
creating a false veneer of judicial objectivity or certainty. 
CONCLUSION 
The new “plausibility” standard places great discretion in the hands of 
judges, who, as the Supreme Court explained in Iqbal, must draw on 
“experience and common sense.”50 One scholar bemoans the word “plausible” 
 
44 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006). 
45 United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 86 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
46 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).  
47 Id.  
48 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011).  
49 Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 35 (2011). 
50 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Defining judicial experience and its relevance 
to “plausibility” assessments provides yet another challenge. See generally Henry S. Noyes, The 
Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly, and the Application of Judicial 
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as simply “too general a word to be the basis of a judge-made revolution 
involving pleading and open access to courts.”51 Thus, Professor Kaplow 
labels the “plausibility” standard “unclear, question-begging in key respects, 
and at bottom open-ended.”52 These concerns all invite a normative assessment: 
if no words can clearly express a judge’s task, perhaps that task should not 
be performed at all.  
Exploring the contradictory meanings of “plausibility” does not resolve 
its definitional paradoxes, but does help to clarify them. The Court chose a 
word that candidly admits its competing meanings. In contrast, the much 
used and abused “reasonable” may suggest a misleading sense of precision. 
Had the Court gone down the same road to raise the bar for pleading 
standards, but selected “reasonable” or “probable” or other such terms, the 
consequences might have been far more problematic.  
A swindler may appear trustworthy, while an innocent may falsely confess. 
Facts alleged in a pleading may be accurate or superficial. Similarly, a 
judge’s decision about whether to accept a pleading may or may not appear 
“plausible.” As a result, the chief virtue of the new “plausibility” standard is 
the transparency of its vice. 
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Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 871-78 (2012) (critiquing the Court’s reliance on “judicial 
experience” by highlighting its failure to explain the term). 
51 Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the Sympo-
sium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 9 (2010). 
52 Kaplow, supra note 19, at 1297. 
